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State of Nevada v. Second Judicial District Court., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (Jul. 19, 2018)1
CRIMINAL LAW: PLEA BARGAINS
Summary
The Court determined that when the State allows a defendant to plead guilty to a first
offense domestic battery for a second offense of domestic battery, the State must treat the second
conviction as a first conviction for enhancement purposes unless the defendant receives
appropriate clarification and warning of the State’s intention to use the second conviction as a
second conviction for future enhancement purposes.
Background
Under NRS 200.485(1), a second domestic battery conviction within seven years is a
misdemeanor (like a first domestic battery offense), but it carries an enhanced fine, minimum jail
sentence, and minimum community service requirement. A third domestic battery conviction
within seven years may be treated as a category C felony.
John Kephart entered a plea of no contest to a domestic battery charge in May 2010.
Kephart also entered a guilty plea to a second domestic battery charge in July 2010. Kephart
represented himself in his second domestic battery case. While Kephart originally pled not guilty,
Kephart changed his plea to guilty after the State amended their complaint so that it read as a
charge for a first domestic battery offense rather than a second domestic battery offense. After
pleading guilty, Kephart signed an admonishment of rights stating:
I understand that the State will use this conviction and any other prior conviction
from this or any other state which prohibits the same or similar conduct, to enhance
the penalty for any subsequent offense.
Kephart’s third and current conviction for domestic battery came in January 2017. A jury
found him guilty of domestic battery. At sentencing, the State sought felony treatment under NRS
200.485(1)(c) for enhanced penalties for multiple domestic batteries. Kephart objected, claiming
that the conditions of his plea in his second case led him to believe that his next offense (the current
offense) would be treated as his second offense for all purposes. While the district court did not
find that the State had affirmatively agreed not to use Kephart’s second conviction for future
sentence enhancement, it did find that the State’s notice to Kephart that the July 2010 offense could
be used in future sentence enhancement was inadequate. For that reason, the district court declined
to consider Kephart’s July 2010 conviction in sentencing him. The district court vacated the
sentencing hearing so that the State could appeal. The State filed a writ of mandamus.
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Discussion
The Court first noted that the reason for the enhanced penalties under NRS 200.485 was to
discourage recidivism. The Court further discussed how the domestic battery statutes were
modeled on the state’s DUI enhancement statutes.
The Court first examined NRS 200.485 under a plain text reading. It noted that NRS
200.485 provided that:
An offense that occurs within 7 years immediately preceding the date of the
principal offense or after the principal offense constitutes a prior offense for the
purposes of this section when evidenced by a conviction, without regard to the
sequence of the offenses and convictions.2
After considering the statute, the Court determined that the plain language of NRS 200.485 clearly
undercut the district court’s decision. It noted that the only relevant question was how many prior
convictions Kephart had for domestic battery within the past seven years. Whether the plea claimed
it was a first offense or not was largely irrelevant because the statute specifically states it only
matters how many prior convictions the defendant had within the past seven years.
However, the Court noted that this interpretation was complicated by the developed caselaw surrounding the DUI enhancement statutes on which NRS 200.485 was modeled. The Court
cited State v. Smith for the notion that unless the defendant is told otherwise, it is reasonable for
the defendant to conclude that in being allowed to plead to a second offense as a first offense, the
State is willing to treat the second offense as a first offense for enhancement purposes.3 The Court
therefore noted that when a defendant pleads a second offense DUI down to a first offense, that
appropriate clarification and warning is required if the State intends to use the second offense as
a second offense for enhancement purposes.
The Court also took special note of the case Speer v. State. Unlike in Smith, where the plea
the defendant accepted was silent as to future enhancement consequences of the plea, in Speer, the
plea specifically articulated that “the parties agree that the conviction would not be treated as a
‘first offense’ for all purposes and that Speer’s next offense could be treated as a felony.” 4 The
court in Speer then determined that whether a plea that treated a second DUI offense as a first DUI
offense could be used for enhancement purposes, was based on whether the State had articulated
whether it retained the right to use the second conviction for enhancement purposes.
The Court applied this logic to the present case and found that Kephart had specifically
acknowledged that the State retained the ability to use his second conviction for potential future
enhancement purposes. The Court further noted that Kephart was informed of the escalating
penalties for first, second, and third domestic battery offenses. The Court reasoned that because
Kephart had specifically acknowledged those penalties, he could not claim that he reasonably
relied on the second conviction not being used for future enhancement purposes. The Court noted
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that while Kephart had testified that he understood the plea agreement to mean his second
conviction would be treated as a first offense, that belief seemed to be entirely subjective, and not
based on any representations from either the State or the Court. Therefore, his belief was
unreasonable. The Court further claimed that Kephart still retained a benefit from the negotiation
even if the second conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. A first offense domestic
battery carries with it a lower penalty than a second offense domestic battery, and thus the
Kephart’s benefit he derived from the plea was in the form of a less penalizing sentence for his
second conviction. The Court thus granted the State’s request for extraordinary relief and directed
the district court to admit Kephart’s July 2010 domestic battery conviction to enhance his third
conviction to a felony.
Conclusion
The Court determined that where the State specifically reserved the right to use the second
domestic battery offense for future sentence enhancement purposes, it was unreasonable for the
defendant to assume the second conviction would be treated as a first offense. Therefore, the Court
granted the State’s request to admit the defendant’s second conviction to enhance his third
conviction to a felony.

